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Abstract The study examines the association between the size of previous environmental
sanction charges and subsequent compliance towards environmental regulations. Data used
for the study come from about 9000 Swedish firms fined sometime between January 2002
and December 2012. Probabilities of compliance across various levels of sanctions are
estimated using life-table methods and tested for equality using standard nonparametric
methods. Association between size of sanction charges and subsequent behaviour is
modelled by proportional hazard model for the rate of recidivism as well as by a family of
flexible parametric accelerated failure-time models for the duration of compliance. The
results show that duration of compliance may be described by a log-normal distribution.
Further, it is demonstrated that sanctions charges do have significant detering effects on the
risk of recidivism though the strength of the detering effect depends on whether or not we
account for other possible correlates of recidivism. Possible explanations of the results and
their policy implications are discussed; limitations of the current study highlighted; and
potential extensions for future studies outlined.
Keywords Environmental regulations  Environmental sanctions charges 
Time to re-offens  Modelling duration data  Recidivism  Sweden
1 Introduction
The overall aim of this paper is to measure the effect of environmental sanction charges on
subsequent behavior with regard to violation to environmental regulations. Effect, in turn,
is defined as a change that has occurred as a result of a specific measure taken—that
otherwise would not have occurred or occurred at a latter time. It is then clear that it is not
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an easy task to measure effect as there are many variables which may influence envi-
ronmental behavior of firms and individuals and the state of the environment, irrespective
of enforcement actions. Further, substantial time may elapse between the application of
enforcement measures and changes made evident in the environment.
National and international environmental agencies use a wide range of indicators to
assess environmental conditions in general and the efficiency of enforcement measures in
particular. One such measure suggested has been the extent of recidivism—the act of
repeating violation to environmental regulations after a firm has been fined (penalized) for
that behavior. Rates of recidivism and the duration in compliance have been suggested as
output measures (International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement
2008). Potential flaws in using recidivism ratios as measures of regulatory efficiency is
outlined in a report by U.S. Environmental Protection Agency—Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance (2008). The main concern is that it is not possible to generalize
observed recidivism rates among facilities which were inspected to those which were not
inspected because some entities will be missed committing acts which, if they were caught
to do so, would constitute recidivism. Because of this drawback, it is suggested to use a
measure of chronic noncompliance as an alternative to recidivism rates. A potentially
useful formulation of chronic recidivism suggested in the literature is the average or
median length of time facilities/firms spend in compliance/noncompliance.
However, little is known about the empirics of environmental recidivism. In particular,
to the best of our knowledge, there has not been any study proposing appropriate statistical
methods to analyze data on length of compliance (time to recidivism) and model its
association with background characteristics of facilities.
This paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature by presenting a number of statistical
procedures of varying degree of complexity. The procedures are then illustrated using data
on about 9000 Swedish firms which were fined sometime between January 2002 and
December 2012. The goal of the study is to examine the effect of the size of sanction on the
length of compliance.
In Sect. 2, we describe the data in more details. Section 3 presents a number of
appropriate statistical methods and illustrates them empirically. These methods include
Kaplan–Meier and Life Table methods for estimating survival functions; nonparametric
Log-Rank and Breslow (Generalized Wilcoxon) tests for comparing the survival functions,
Cox proportional hazard model for the rate of recidivism as well as a family of flexible
parametric accelerated failure-time models for the duration of compliance. The last section
ties up the contents of the paper in the form of concluding remarks, outline of limitations of
the study, and potential extensions for further study.
2 The data set
Since 1999, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency has compiled statistics on
imposed environmental sanction charges (Naturva˚rdsverket 2010). According to the
source, Environmental sanction charges are administrative charges accruing to the gov-
ernment and they can be between SEK 1000 and SEK 1,000,000. Municipalities, county
administrative boards and other central supervising authorities can decide that sanction
charges be paid by those carrying out an activity, for which they have not been granted
permission or which does not comply with the conditions given in the environmental code.
We have got access to such data from January 2002 up to December 2012.
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The initial data set consisted of 8983 cases (decisions on sanction charges) that took
place sometime between January 2002 and December 2012 (see Table 1). Thus, of the
8983 cases/firms analyzed in this study, 4867 (54.18%) were fined less than 5000 SEK for
previous offense, 3093 (34.43%) were fined 5000–10,000 SEK for previous offense while
the rest 1023 (11.39%) were fined more than 10,000 SEK for previous offense.
By the end of the follow-up period (31 December 2012), 3279 (36.50%) of the firms
have committed first re-offense while the rest 5704 (63.50%) were still complying and,
hence, considered as censored. Of the 3279 recidivists 1928 (58.80%) were fined less than
5000 SEK for previous offense, 1080 (32.94%) were fined 5000–10,000 SEK for previous
offense while the rest 271 (8.26%) were fined more than 10,000 SEK for previous offense.
The overall mean survival time was 76 months while the mean survival times for the three
categories were 63, 79, and 91 months respectively.
A first impression we get from Table 1 is that while the percentage of recidivists coming
from the 2nd group of firms is about the same as their percentage sizes in the entire sample,
the percentage of recidivist firms from the 1st groups (those fined with less than 5000 SEK
for previous offense), 58.80%, is higher than their percentage sizes in the entire sample
(54.18%). On the other hand, the percentage of recidivists from the 3rd group (those fined
with more than 10,000 SEK for previous offense), 8.26%, is less than the corresponding
percentage contribution of these firms to the entire sample, (11.39%). In the next section,
we shall present various analytical tools that can be used to formally test this differential in
recidivism across levels of sanction charges.
3 Modelling the association between sanction charges and recidivism
3.1 Non-parametric estimation and comparison of survival functions
We begin with estimation and comparison of basic survival functions across the three levels
of sanction charges. Life-table (actuarial) estimates of survival values are plotted in Fig. 1.As
shown in the figure, the survival probabilities (probabilities of complyingwith environmental
regulations), SjðtÞ, by the end of the observation time are 0%, 55%, and 72% for the three
groups of firms. In other words, by the end of the follow-up time (31 December 2012), 100%
of the first group of firms (those who were charged less than 5000 SEK) have committed an
environmental re-offense. The corresponding values for the 2nd and 3rd groups of firms was
45 and, 28%, respectively. The figure also shows that the 1st quartiles (the number of months
by which 25% of the firms have committed re-offense) are 22 months for the entire sample,
20 months for the first group (thosewhowere charged less than 5000SEK), 23 months for the
second group (those whowere charged 5000–10,000 SEK) and 45 months for the third group
(thosewhowere charged 10,000SEKor higher). The 2nd and 3rd quartiles for the 1st group of
firms are 76 and 99 months, respectively while the 2nd and 3rd group of firms have not yet
reached 50% of recidivism by the end of the observation time.
A formal test of the hypothesis:
H0 : S1ðtÞ ¼ S2ðtÞ ¼ S3ðtÞ
against
H1 : SiðtÞ 6¼ SjðtÞ for at least one pair ði; jÞ;
shows that there are significant differences between the survival functions of the different
groups of firms. The Chi-square values are v2 ¼ 141 (Log-Rank) and v2 ¼ 64 (Generalized
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Wilcoxon) tests—both with p values less than 0.001. Further, pairwise-tests for equality of
the survival curves yield the results displayed in Table 2 which, again, indicate statistically
significant differences between the survival curves of the three groups of firms classified by
size of previous sanctions charges.
3.2 A logistic-regression model for the probability of recidivism
Let Y be an indicator of recidivism:
Yk ¼ 1; if firm k is a recidivist, i.e. has committed re-offensewithin the follow up period0; otherwise, i.e. if firm kwas still complying until the end of the follow up period

Let p = P(Y = 1) be the probability that a randomly selected firm is a recidivist. Our goal
is to model this probability p as a function of the size of sanctions charge using a binary
logistic regression model:
Table 1 Distribution of recidivism and exposure across covariates
Covariate Levels # firms Recid. % Recid. Exp.a Rateb RRc
Size of previous sanction (SEK) \5000 4867 1928 39.61 173,416 11.12 2.55
5000–10,000 3093 1080 34.92 139,903 7.72 1.77
C10,000 1023 271 26.49 62,086 4.36 1
Number of employees None 2767 699 25.26 137,134 5.10 0.16
1–9 1909 404 21.16 88,805 4.55 0.15
10–99 2299 678 29.49 101,790 6.66 0.21
C100 2008 1498 74.60 47,676 31.42 1
Implementing auth. Municpalities 7722 2888 37.40 321,687 8.98 1.69
County admin 549 225 40.98 22,543 9.98 1.88
Other auth. 712 166 23.31 31,175 5.32 1
Motive groupd Group 1 1827 543 29.72 94,593 5.74 1.06
Group 2 2118 550 25.97 146,604 3.75 0.69
Group 3 4672 2108 45.12 119,849 17.59 3.24
Group 4 366 78 21.31 14,359 5.43 1
Total 8983 3279 36.50 375,405 8.73 –
a Exp. stands for the accumulated period/months in which the firms were exposed to the risk of recidivism
b The Recidivsm Rates (Recid./Exp.) are initial estimates of the intensities when no account is taken for
other factors. They are expressed per 1000 exposure months. A crude estimate of the overall recidivism rate
is thus (3279/375,405) * 1000 = 8.73 re-offenses per month for every 1000 firms or, equivalently, about
105 re-offenses for every 1000 firms per year
c RR stands for Relative Rates (relative to that of the highest level of each covariate)
d The motives were grouped as follows
Motive Group 1: Species protection provisions, waste, electrical and electronical products, chemical
products and biotechnical organisms, unknown
Motive Group 2: Environmentally hazardous activity and public health safety
Motive Group 3: Environmental risk areas
Motive Group 4: Open-pit mining/source and agriculture, violations of provisions for gene technology
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log itðpÞ ¼ ln p
1 p
 
¼ b0 þ b1X1 þ b2X2 ð1Þ
where X1 is a dummy (0, 1) variable indicating firms from group 1, and X2 is a dummy (0,
1) variable indicating firms from group 2. Firms from group 3 (those who were charged
10,000 SEK or higher) are used as reference levels, and both X1 and X2 have value 0 over
all firms in group 3. The results (see Table 3) show a significant 49% higher odds of
recidivism for firms in group 2 (those who were charged 5000–10,000 SEK) and even a
highly significant 82% higher odds of recidivism for firms in group 1 (those who were
charged less than 5000 SEK).
The corresponding probabilities of recidivism for each group of sanctions charges may
be computed as follows (Table 4).
Substituting the corresponding estimates (bbi in Table 3) yields the following
probabilities:
Months since decision on latest offence


















































Survival Functions for Environmental Recidivism. Sweden, 2002-2012
Latest Sanction lower than 5000 SEK
Latest Sanction between 5000-10000 SEK
Latest Sanction 10000 SEK or higher
Total
Fig. 1 Proportion of firms complying with environmental regulation across size of latest sanctions charges
Table 2 Results of tests for equality of survival functions
Test statistic Null hypothesis Chi-square p value
Log-rank S1ðtÞ ¼ S2ðtÞ 41.70 \0.001
S1ðtÞ ¼ S3ðtÞ 148.27 \0.001
S2ðtÞ ¼ S3ðtÞ 47.60 \0.001
Breslow (Generalized Wilcoxon) S1ðtÞ ¼ S2ðtÞ 8.50 \0.001
S1ðtÞ ¼ S3ðtÞ 64.04 \0.001
S2ðtÞ ¼ S3ðtÞ 33.02 \0.001
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bp1 ¼
exp bb0 þ bb1
h i
1þ exp bb0 þ bb1
h i ¼ exp 1:02þ 0:60½ 
1þ exp 1:02þ 0:60½  ¼ 0:40;
bp2 ¼
exp bb0 þ bb2
h i
1þ exp bb0 þ bb2
h i ¼ exp 1:02þ 0:40½ 






h i ¼ exp 1:02½ 
1þ exp 1:02½  ¼ 0:27:
Thus, firms in the the 3rd group (those which had highest sanction charges for previous
offenses) are much less likely to commit recidivism compared to those in 1st and 2nd
groups (those which had lower sanctions charges).
As shown above, the logistic regression model provides a general picture of the asso-
ciation between the probability of recidivism and the size of previous sanctions charges.
However, it should be noted that the model is static in the sense that the focus is whether or
not recidivism has occurred sometime within the follow-up period—with no account taken
to the length of time until recidivism. In the next two subsections, we describe and
implement two dynamic models that take into account the time until recidivism and, hence,
use the data more efficiently. The Cox proportional hazards model is presented below
while the last subsection presents the accelerated failure-time (AFT) models.
3.3 Hazard models for the rate of recidivism
In analyzing recidivism data, interest may focus on examining the effects of sanctions on
the hazard function of recidivism. Such a function, commonly denoted by kðtÞ, is defined
as the instantaneous rate at which recidivism occurs at a specific point t:
Table 3 Results from a logistic regression on the probability of recidivism
Sanctions (SEK) bbi se(bbi) Wald-stat df p value Odds ratio (OR) 95% CI for odds ratio
\5000 0.60 0.08 56.25 1 0.00 1.82 (1.57; 2.12)
5000–10,000 0.40 0.08 25.00 1 0.00 1.49 (1.27; 1.74)
Constant -1.02 0.07 212.32 1 0.00
Table 4 Probabilities of recidivism across size of sanction charges
Sanction charges on previous offense (SEK)
Recidivism indicator Y \5000 5000–10,000 C10,000
Y = 1 (Recidivism) p1¼ exp b0þb1½ 1þexp b0þb1½  p2¼
exp b0þb2½ 
1þexp b0þb2½  p3¼
exp b0½ 
1þexp b0½ 
Y = 0 (Compliance) 1 p1¼ 11þexp b0þb1½  1 p2¼
1
1þexp b0þb2½  1 p3¼
1
1þexp b0½ 





P t\T 6 t þ DtjT[ t½ 
Dt
ð2Þ
Recidivism rates may vary not only over time but also among firms’ characteristics. In
the present study, the objective is to draw inferences about the influence of environmental
sanction charges on the hazard of recidivism.
One possible statistical model is Cox ’s (1972) proportional hazards model where
sanction charges (here denoted by z) affects the hazard of recidivism in a multiplicative
manner according to
kðtjzÞ ¼ k0ðtÞ exp zbð Þ: ð3Þ
Here, k0ðtÞ is an unspecified base-line function of time and b is an unknown parameter
representing the effect of sanction z. The factor expðzbÞ describes the hazard of recidivism
for an individual firm with sanction z relative to that of a standard (with z = 0 ). Details on
estimation and tests on b may be found in Cox (1975). Standard statistical software like R,
SAS, SPSS, STATA first transform the above model (3) into a linear model:
ln kðtjzÞ½  ¼ ln k0ðtÞ½  þ zb; ð4Þ
and provide estimates of b together with their standard errors, 95% confidence intervals, as
well as estimates of the corresponding relative hazards, exp zbb .
Results from the above model yielded the following estimates (Table 5).
Thus, the relative hazard of recidivism of the 1st group of firms (those charged\5000
SEK previously) is 2.06. In other words, these firms have a risk of recidivism that is
twice (2.06 times) as that of the baseline group of firms (those charged 10,000 SEK or
more previously). Moreover, this difference is highly significant as indicated by the
p value of 0.00. Similarly, the 2nd group of firms (those charged 5000–10,000 SEK for
previous offence) have a relative hazard of 1.63 which, in turn, means their risk of
recidivism is 1.63 times that of the baseline group of firms. This difference is also highly
significant as indicated by the low p value of 0.00. In sum, we note that higher sanction
charges are associated with reduced risks of recidivism. To examine for possible
interactions between the size of sanctions charges and other characteristics of firms we
fitted nested hazards models with results presented in Table 6. The table shows that the
relative risk vary depending on whether other covariates are included in the model. This
variation is consistent with the frequency distribution of recidivism across cross clas-
sifications of these covariates as shown in Table 7. We, therefore, present sanctions-
profiles of relative risks across motive (Table 8) and motive-profiles of relative risks
across sanctions (Table 9).
Table 5 Results from a univariate proportional hazards model
Sanctions (SEK) bbi se(bbi) Wald-stat df p value Hazard ratio 95% CI for hazard ratio
\5000 0.72 0.065 121.9 1 0.00 2.06 (1.81; 2.34)
5000–10,000 0.49 0.068 51.8 1 0.00 1.63 (1.43; 1.86)
C10,000 0 – – – – 1
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Table 6 Relative risks of recidivism in nested hazards models (* 0.10\p value\0.05; ** 0.05 B p value
\ 0.01; *** p value B 0.01)
Covariate Level Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Sanctions (SEK) \5000 2.06*** 1.98*** 1.88*** 1.43***
5000–10,000 1.63*** 1.62*** 1.56*** 1.23***
C10,000 (Ref) 1 1 1 1
Number of None – 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.23***
Employees 1–9 – 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.20***
10–99 – 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.27***
100 or more (Ref) – 1 1 1
Implementing Municipalities – – 1.22** 1.35***
Authority County Adm. Board – – 1.15 1.75 ***
Other central auth. (Ref) – – 1 1
Motiv group Group 1 – – – 0.70**
Group 2 – – – 0.56***
Group 3 – – – 1.57***
Group 4 (Ref) – – – 1
Table 7 Distribution of events
(recidivism) and exposure-
months across motive and sanc-
tions (see Table 1 for definition
of columns)
Motive Sanctions Recid. Exp Rate RR
1 \5000 429 43,422 9.88 3.42
5000–10,000 43 26,578 1.62 0.56
C10,000 71 24,593 2.89 1
2 \5000 306 56,673 5.40 1.30
5000–10,000 158 69,314 2.28 0.55
C10,000 86 20,617 4.17 1
3 \5000 1172 72,374 16.19 1.06
5000–10,000 862 42,637 20.22 1.32
C10,000 74 4838 15.30 1
4 \5000 21 947 22.18 6.68
5000–10,000 17 1374 12.37 3.73
C10,000 40 12,038 3.32 1
Total 3279 375,405 8.73 –
Table 8 Sanctions-profiles of
Relative Risks across Motive
Sanctions Motive 1 Motive 2 Motive 3 Motive 4
\5000 3.42 1.30 1.06 6.68
5000–10,000 0.56 0.55 1.32 3.73
C10,000 1 1 1 1
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3.4 Accelerated failure-time models for the duration of compliance
In the proportional hazards models (3) the explanatory variables (sanctions charges) act
multiplicatively on the baseline hazard so that their effect is to increase or decrease the
hazard relative to k0ðtÞ. Another class of models, known as accelerated failure-time models
which are closer to ordinary linear regression, specifies the covariates to act multiplicatively
on event time itself (or linearly on log-failure time) rather than on the hazard function.
Let T0 be the time (duration) to recidivism associated with a firm in the baseline (first
group) corresponding to zero values for the covariates ðz ¼ 0Þ, then the accelerated failure
time model specifies that if for z 6¼ 0, the event time (duration) to recidivism would be:
T ¼ T0expðzbÞ ð5Þ
or equivalently, that
ln Tð Þ ¼ ln T0ð Þ þ zb ð6Þ
where, as before, T is the vector of failure times, z is a vector of covariates or independent
variables, b is a vector of unknown regression parameters.
Since covariates alter, by a scale factor, the rate at which an individual traverses the
time axis, (5) is referred to as the accelerated failure time model. Thus, in accelerated
failure-life models the explanatory variables act multiplicatively on time to the event so
that their effect is to accelerate or decelerate time to failure relative to T0.
One point that is worth noting at this stage is that the parameterizations in (3) and (5) are
different. A positive coefficient in (3) implies an increased hazard (shorter duration) while
in (5) it implies longer duration (decreased hazard) relative to that of the baseline (where
covariates assume the value of zero).
The model in (6) is a linear model with ln T0ð Þ playing the role of an error term with an
underlying baseline distribution. Usually, an intercept term a and a scale parameter d are
allowed in the model to give
ln Tð Þ ¼ aþ zbþ dln T0ð Þ ð7Þ
or more explicitly as
ln Tð Þ ¼ zb þ d ð8Þ
where b ¼ a bð Þ and a more conventional notation, , is used for the random error term.
The distribution of the random error term can be taken from a class of distributions that
includes the extreme-value, normal, and logistic distributions, and, by using a log trans-
formation, exponential, Weibull, lognormal, log-logistic and gamma distributions. In
general, the distribution may depend on additional shape parameter k to give (Stacey 1962)
a generalized gamma model:
Table 9 Motive-profiles of Rel-
ative Risks across sanctions
Motive Size of sanctions charge (SEK)
\5000 5000–10,000 C10,000
1 0.45 0.13 0.87
2 0.24 0.69 1.26
3 0.73 1.63 4.61
4 1 1 1
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f ðk; Þ ¼ 1
CðkÞ exp k expðÞ½ ; 1\zb
\1; 1\\1; d; k[ 0: ð9Þ
Further extensions by Prentice (1974) and Farewell and Prentice (1977) have led to an
extended generalized gamma (EGG) distribution with shape parameter q ¼ k12. Such an
EGG distribution is the distribution of T when the error term in (8) has the following
density function:
f ðq; Þ ¼
qj j
Cðq2Þ ðq
2Þq2 exp q2 q expðqÞð Þ ; q 6¼ 0
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p




The EGG distribution reduces to the standard normal distribution for  when the shape
parameter q is equal to zero. Accordingly, T will have a log-normal distribution. When the
shape parameter q equals 1, (10) reduces to
f ðq; Þ ¼ exp  expðÞf g; 1\\1 ð11Þ
which is the standard (type 1) extreme-value distribution. As ln Tð Þ is a linear function of ,
it has the same (extreme-value) distribution as . Hence T ¼ expðzb þ dÞ will have a
Weibull distribution. If q ¼ 1 and d ¼ 1, then T has the exponential distribution as a
special case of the Weibull distribution. The case of q ¼ 1 corresponds to extreme
maximum-value distribution for lnT. This, in turn, corresponds to reciprocal-Weibull
distribution for T. The case of d ¼ 1 and q[ 0 is also of interest.
Farewell and Prentice (1977) argue that this gives the ordinary gamma distribution for T
though, in accordance with Bergstro¨m and Edin (1992) and Bergstro¨m et al. (1994);
Bergstrom et al. (1997), this does not hold in our case. Consequently, we shall label this
special case (d ¼ 1, q[ 0) the ’gamma’ distribution.
Thus, many common distributions for T are included as special cases of the EGG model
and this makes it easier to choose among competing alternative models using standard
likelihood ratio tests. For more details on estimation and previous applications of the
model, see Addison and Portugal (1987, 1992), Bergstro¨m and Edin (1992), Bergstro¨m
et al. (1994); Bergstrom et al. (1997), and Ghilagaber (2005) among others.
Application of this model on our data set gave the following results (Table 10).
The baseline categories were firms with previous sanction charges of 10,000 SEK or
more. The estimated coefficients represent effects of the other two groups relative the
corresponding baseline level (where covariates assume the value of zero) on duration in
compliance (time until recidivism).
According to the table, firms in the 1st and 2nd group (those with previous charges less
than 10,000 SEK) have shorter compliance durations than those in the 3rd group (those
with previous charges of 10,000 SEK or more). The results are consistent across all
duration models with regard to the direction of effects though they may vary in terms of
strength.
Given the varying strengths of effects across the models, it is natural to ask on which
model inferences should be based. The fact that the common distributions like the Weibull
and lognormal are nested within the more comprehensive EGG model makes it simple to
test the relative merits of the special cases using likelihood ratio tests.
Statistics corresponding to various tests for special cases of the EGG model (10) are
presented in the last row of Table 10. These are used to test whether the corresponding
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special-case model is adequate relative to the more comprehensive EGG model. The
results show that reciprocal Weibull, Weibull, ’gamma’ and exponential models are
rejected in favor of the more general EGG model. On the contrary, the log-normal model is
adequate enough compared to the EGG model (v2 ¼ 1\3:84Þ. This is also supported by
the estimated value of the shape parameter under the EGG model. The estimates of the
shape and scale parameters, as reported in Table 10, are 0:02 and 2.56, respectively. The
estimated shape parameter is, thus, closer to the assertions of the log-normal (in which the
shape parameter is fixed to 0 with a free scale parameter) than to any of the values asserted
by the other distributions (-1 for reciprocal Weibull and 1 for Weibull). As a result, one can
also note that the estimates of the covariates effects in the log-normal model and the EGG
model are much closer while those in the other models differ from the estimates of the
EGG model. In other words, we have a statistical justification to base our inference on the
results from the log-normal model (in the case where only sanctions charges is included as
covariate).
When we include all covariates, however, none of the special cases performs as good as
the general EGG model and, hence, we prefer to keep the more comprehensive model and
draw our conclusions based of estimates from that model. Results from nested EGG
models are shown in Table 11.
Thus, if T3 is the time (duration) to recidivism associated with a firm in the baseline
(third group) the event time to recidivism for the 1st group of firms is given by
bT 1 ¼ T3  exp bb1
 
¼ T3  exp 1:10ð Þ ¼ 0:33  T3
while that of the 2nd group of firms is given by
bT 2 ¼ T3  exp bb2
 
¼ T3  exp 0:87ð Þ ¼ 0:42  T3
Using the results where we control for the other three covariates, we have,
bT 1 ¼ T3  exp bb1
 
¼ T3  exp 0:39ð Þ ¼ 0:68  T3
bT 2 ¼ T3  exp bb2
 
¼ T3  exp 0:17ð Þ ¼ 0:84  T3
Table 10 Effects of Sanctions Charges on log-duration to first recidivism under various models (***
p value B 0.01)
Covariate EGG Rec.
Weib.
Lognormal Weibull ‘Gamma’ Exponential Loglogistic
Intercept 5.64 4.74 5.65 6.12 10.35 5.43 5.58
Scale parameter (d) 2.56 3.10 2.55 1.60 1 1 1.41
Shape parameter (q) -0.02 -1 0 19.69 1 –
MSA\5000 SEK -1.10 -0.94 -1.10 -1.22 -1.87 -0.94 -1.15
MSA 5000–10,000
SEK
-0.87 -0.88 -0.87 -0.81 2.21 -0.57 -0.84
MSA C10,000 SEK 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
-2LogLik 21,409 21,493 21,410 21,511 22,217 22,619 21,484
Diff (Chi-square) – 84*** 1 102*** 808*** 1210*** –
Environmental recidivism in Sweden: distributional shape and...
123
A randomly selected firm from the 1st group (with previous sanction of less than 5000
SEK) needs 32% shorter time to commit recidivism compared with a firm selected from the
3rd group (with previous sanction of 10,000 SEK or more). Further, this difference is
statistically significant at 5% significance level. On the other hand, a firm randomly
selected from the 2nd group (with previous sanction 5000–10,000 SEK) needs about 16%
shorter time to commit recidivism compared to 3rd group (with previous sanction of
10,000 SEK or more) but this difference is not statistically significant at 5% level of
significance.
4 Summary, concluding remarks, and suggestions for future work
4.1 Summary and concluding remarks
In the present study we have analyzed data on environmental recidivism among about 9000
Swedish firms which were fined with environmental sanction charges sometime between
January 2002 and December 2012. A firm enters into the study at the date of decision of
first known sanction charge and is followed up until it commits a re-offense or the study
ends in December 2012, whichever comes first.
We analyzed the data using various statistical methods ranging from the very standard
nonparametric comparison of two survival curves to an advanced family of flexible
parametric duration models for the association between compliance time and background
covariates.
Our empirical results from all the above analytical methods show that penalty (sanctions
charges), indeed, has a strong deterring effect on recidivism in the sense that firms which
experience higher sanctions charges tend to commit recidivism at much lower rate than
those fined with lower sanctions for previous offenses. We also found that the strength of
Table 11 Effects of Sanctions Charges on log-duration to first recidivism in nested EGG models (* 0.10\
p value\ 0.05; ** 0.05 B p value\ 0.01; *** p value B 0.01)
Covariate Levels Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Sanctions (SEK) \5000 -1.10*** -0.90*** -0.80*** -0.39***
5000–10,000 -0.87*** -0.61*** -0.56*** -0.17
C10,000 (Ref) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
No. Employees None 2.71*** 2.71*** 2.35***
1–9 2.95*** 2.94*** 2.62***
10–99 2.46*** 2.44*** 2.20***
100 or more (Ref) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Authority Municipalities -0.35*** -0.46***
County Adm. Board -0.42** -1.01***
Other Central Auth (Ref) 0.00 0.00
Motive Cause 1 0.48***
Cause 2 0.67***
Cause 3 -0.72***
Cause 4 (Ref) 0.00
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the detering effect depends on whether or not we account for other potential correlates of
recidivism.
4.2 Limitations of the study and recommendations for further study
This study has identified appropriate analytic methods to examine the association between
a firm’s characteristics (such as size of previous sanction charges) and its risk of com-
mitting re-offens. However, apart from the questionable value of recidivism as a measure
of effectiveness, the data set used in this study is not without limitations and such limi-
tations should be borne in mind when attempting to draw conclusions from the analyses.
As described before, a firm enters the study at the date of the first known (not neces-
sarily the first ever) decision. The firm is then followed up until the date of the next
decision (if it has committed recidivism within the follow up period) or the end of the
observation period, December 2012 (if the firm was still complying). The date of decision
is different from the date of when the violation was committed and the (strong) assumption
made here is the time between date of violation and the date of decision is uniform across
the firms. An alternative approach can be to use discrete-time hazard modelling where the
events and exposures are agregated over appropriate duration-intervals.
Moreover, the unit of time used in this study is month. However, it is not certain that
firms are inspected (or decisions on offenses are made) on a monthly basis. The use of
months in the present study may be justified by necessity or convenience—as we have a
relatively long follow-up period of 11 years (the longest observed exposure time was,
however, 120 months).
Further, the study in this paper focuses on time to first recidivism and we have deleted
data referring to more than one recidivism. Including such data in future studies may help
examine if inspectors punish multiple offenders significantly more harshly than one-time
offenders and if this, in turn, is effective in reducing further recidivism.
The study is based on firms that have been charged with sanctions within the study
period and, thus, we have no clue on the behavior of those firms that were not charged
within the period (say those charged before January 2002). Further, we have no infor-
mation on how far back the first offence was committed which, in turn, indicates left
censoring. This may affect the estimates as firm’s propensity to re-offend may depend on
how far back the first offence was committed.
The results also indicate interaction between the size of sanction charges and the motive
for violation. One may suspect that firms that commit relatively ’minor’ offenses are
charged with lower charges which, in turn, has less impact on deterring re-offense. This
implies that the size of sanction charges may in itself be explained by the motive (type of
environmental violation). Examining and adjusting for such endogeneity of the size of
sanctions charges requires more advanced multiprocess modelling which can be an area for
future investigation.
Finally, the effect of sanctions charges on compliance may vary over time. It may, for
instance, have a strong dettering effect immediately after the charges were imposed but its
effect may decline in the long term. Thus, modelling approaches that allow effects of
covariates to change over time (Gamerman 1991; Wagner 2011; Munezero 2016) may be
used to investigate if effects of sanctions charges change over time.
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